Originally published in Small Wars and Insurgencies

Abstract

We trace the influences and evolution of Islamic State’s guerrilla warfare doctrine, how it fits into a larger insurgency strategy, and how its military leaders sequenced the employment of military forces in time and space to achieve operational and strategic effects in its patient and successful campaign to establish its so-called caliphate in 2014. Applying Mao’s three phases of guerrilla warfare, we used a database of Islamic State movement attack claims from 2008 to 2014 to determine the character and patterns of guerrilla tactics during each of these three phases. We found that the group maintained a disciplined and patient approach to achieving political consolidation, eschewing any reliance on popular uprising or conducting large-scale military operations. This knowledge better helps us understand both non-state campaigning and the identification of early warning indicators of insurgent success.

Harrison Schramm teaches in both Defense Management and Operations Research at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. He is the editor of MORS Phalanx magazine.

Craig Whiteside is a professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College resident program at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.

Jeff Hyink was a Senior Operations Research Analyst and military faculty at the Naval Postgraduate.